Chapter 1: The Essence of Virtue Ethics

Is virtue ethics a concept exclusive to the Greco-Roman-Christian traditions, or has it also been contemplated in other philosophical frameworks, particularly those emerging around the same period in India and China, and later in Japan? This inquiry has been the focus of our earlier essays on Buddhism and Confucianism. We now turn our attention to Daoism, inspired by a thought-provoking paper by Yong Huang published in the Journal of Asian Studies, titled "Respecting Different Ways of Life: A Daoist Ethics of Virtue in the 'Zhuangzi.'"

Huang argues for a Daoist interpretation of virtue ethics rooted in the Zhuangzi, a cornerstone of Daoist literature. He emphasizes that variations in virtue ethics stem from their distinct interpretations of what constitutes virtue. For instance, Aristotelian virtue ethics aligns with the eudaimonist perspective prevalent in ancient Greece and Rome, while David Hume's approach is grounded in intuitionism. Huang seeks to apply this intuitionist framework to Daoism.

The intuitionist perspective is particularly fitting as the Zhuangzi primarily communicates through narratives rather than formal arguments, as seen in Aristotelian texts. These narratives can be categorized into two types: knack stories and difference stories. Knack stories feature masters who perform intricate tasks almost instinctively, achieving what contemporary psychologists might describe as a state of flow. A prime example is Cook Ding, who skillfully carves an ox:

"With every movement of his hand, shoulder, foot, and knee, the knife slices through the flesh, creating a rhythm that harmonizes with the Dance of Mulberry Trees and the music of Jing-shou from the time of Sage Yao." (Zhuangzi 3.117–18).

When asked to articulate his experience, Cook Ding remarks:

"My passion lies in the Dao, transcending mere skill. Initially, I perceived the entire ox as a whole. After three years, my perspective shifted; now I see the ox through intuition rather than sight. My senses yield to this mystical insight. By following the ox's natural structure, I cut along its main seams, avoiding veins and tendons, not to mention the large bones. Talented cooks replace their knives annually, while common ones do so monthly as they butcher bones. I've used this knife for nineteen years, carving thousands of oxen, yet its edge remains as sharp as when it first touched the whetstone. I stand, knife in hand, surveying my work, relishing my triumph until satisfied." (Zhuangzi 3.119).

You're probably wondering: what about the ethics of butchering thousands of oxen? We will address that soon. In the meantime, if you'd like to appreciate the beauty of Cook Ding's narrative, consider watching the documentary "Jiro Dreams of Sushi." I assure you, it's worth your time.

Returning to Daoism, another story (Zhuangzi 13.491) features a character discussing his knack for wheel-making, yet he cannot articulate or impart this skill to his son. This scenario echoes Socrates's assertion in the Meno that virtue cannot be taught; otherwise, virtuous fathers would be able to instill virtue in their sons:

"[Thucydides] hailed from a prominent family; he wielded considerable influence in the city and among other Greeks. If virtue could indeed be taught, he would have found an individual capable of shaping his sons into good men, whether a citizen or a stranger, even if he lacked the time due to public obligations. But, dear Anytus, virtue cannot be taught." (Meno, 94).

Anytus becomes incensed at Socrates, perceiving it as a personal insult. He eventually becomes one of the three individuals who accuse Socrates, leading to his death sentence. This illustrates the risks associated with expressing philosophical views!

Huang notes that the knack stories in the Zhuangzi emphasize spontaneity, grace, effortlessness, and joy, with protagonists seamlessly flowing into the Dao. The underlying notion is that these tales inspire us and motivate us to engage in tasks effectively. There exists a natural order, and it is the Daoist sage's role to align with it. This concept bears resemblance to Stoicism, which also posits that nature exhibits order through the logos, and that we should aspire to live in harmony with it. However, remember that in Stoicism, sages are exceedingly rare, if they exist at all.

The knack stories further highlight the significance of fulfilling roles correctly, whether as an ox carver or a wheel maker. One could draw a parallel to Stoic virtue ethics, which takes on two forms: one articulated by the middle Stoic Panaetius in book I of Cicero's "On Duties," and the other by Epictetus in various sections of the "Discourses" (refer to "The Role Ethics of Epictetus: Stoicism in Ordinary Life" by Brian Johnson).

However, this only scratches the surface. Huang argues that while knack stories illustrate how to perform actions well, they do not specify which actions are morally right—akin to the Stoic kathekonta, or appropriate actions. This latter aspect is presented through the Zhuangzi's second cluster of stories, known as difference stories.

One such narrative recounts the Marquis of Lu, who encounters a seabird outside his palace. He offers the bird wine and commands music to entertain it, treating the creature as he would wish to be treated. Consequently, the bird perishes three days later (Zhuangzi 18.621). What is the lesson behind these stories? In a chapter aptly titled "The Equality of Things," Zhuangzi states:

"If a human sleeps in a damp location, they will suffer from pain and paralysis. Is this true for eels? If a human resides in a tree, they will tremble in fear. Is this true for monkeys? Which of the three understands the proper place to live?" (Zhuangzi 2.93).

According to Huang, the takeaway is an ethics of difference: the appropriateness of our actions as moral agents hinges on the needs of those we impact. This entails acknowledging the intrinsic worth of diverse forms of life (hence the title of the aforementioned chapter in the Zhuangzi). Instead of imposing our moral standards, we should recognize and respect the standards of others. Both Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius echo similar sentiments, albeit with a more prescriptive tone than in Daoism:

"Whenever you see someone grieving over the loss of a child or property, ensure you don't get swept up in the notion that their external circumstances are genuinely negative. Instead, remember that 'It's not the event that's distressing him (otherwise everyone would be distressed), but his judgment of it.' Do not hesitate to express sympathy and even share in their mourning if the situation warrants it. However, ensure your own sorrow remains separate." (Enchiridion 16).

Epictetus acknowledges that individuals possess unique needs that deserve respect and should not be subjected to our own perspectives. Nevertheless, he also asserts that the Stoic path is superior and that we benefit from adopting it when faced with similar challenges. I doubt Zhuangzi would take such a strong stance.

Returning to the oxen, we can argue that their true nature is not to be slaughtered for human consumption, suggesting that while Cook Ding operates skillfully, he may not act ethically. Huang observes:

"Difference stories reveal what constitutes a morally appropriate action—the action that honors the equal value of diverse ways of life—while knack stories illustrate how to execute these morally appropriate actions in a commendable manner—spontaneously, naturally, and effortlessly. It is misguided to interpret knack stories as defining moral actions or to view difference stories as prescribing how to conduct our moral actions. To fully grasp the ethics of difference in the Zhuangzi, we must integrate the insights conveyed through these two different sets of narratives." (p. 1059).

Huang proposes that Zhuangzi's ethics of difference aligns with the Copper Rule: "Do (or do not do) unto others as they would (or would not) have us do unto them." However, if Daoist ethics is rule-based, how can it simultaneously be classified as a form of virtue ethics? The implication here is that virtue ethics can coexist with rules, as long as these rules stem from virtues. In this scenario, the Copper Rule emerges from the virtue of respect for diverse ways of life. Similarly, the Stoics derive their appropriate actions (kathekonta) from virtues, rather than the reverse.

In both virtue ethics and Daoism, the aim is to act morally in a manner that is natural, effortless, graceful, and joyful. This sentiment can be reflected in Epictetus's third discipline, that of assent, albeit expressed in a more dramatic and less upbeat manner:

"I wish for what I have learned to be securely and unassailably accessible to me, not only in waking hours but also while I sleep, when I'm inebriated, and during my darkest moods." (Discourses, 2.17).

Achieving this—whether in Daoism or Stoicism—requires mindful effort. The masters within the knack stories do not possess their talents innately, and likewise, we do not inherently have a natural inclination to honor the natural tendencies of others. Instead, we choose to act morally, even if our initial attempts may be awkward and unrefined. The ideal is attained only through extensive practice.

In a sense, the Zhuangzi suggests that we should nurture our natural inclinations, which might seem contradictory but closely resembles the Stoic (and Ciceronian) idea that nature provides the foundation for virtue, but it is our responsibility to employ reason to cultivate and enhance those beginnings. Unlike other animals, which can only exist as they are instinctively, we can assist one another in becoming more authentically natural.

Thus, morality in Daoism encompasses various forms of knowledge: the knowledge of what actions to take (difference stories), the knowledge of how to execute those actions (knack stories), and an inner, instinctual understanding.

"It is easy to love with effort, but more challenging to love effortlessly. This may sound paradoxical, yet it conveys a profound truth: sages can perform tasks effortlessly, but one cannot attain sagehood without significant effort." (Huang, p. 1065).

Seneca would likely resonate with this perspective.

Chapter 2: The Philosophy of Daoism and Stoicism

In this video, "Taoism Vs Stoicism," the distinctions and similarities between these two philosophical traditions are explored, shedding light on their approaches to ethics and virtue.

Chapter 3: Understanding the Significance of Zhuang Zi

"The Significance of Taoism by Zhuang Zi" delves into the profound insights offered by Zhuang Zi, exploring the essence of Daoist thought and its implications for ethics.