Chapter 1: Understanding Disposition Talk

One cannot directly perceive mental dispositions, yet our scientific inclinations have led us to attempt this. Consequently, we have witnessed an explosion of various practices, theories, and doctrines. I will focus on three primary forms of disposition discourse that seem fundamental: discussions of faculties, classifications of types, and the notion of intuition.

Michel Foucault examines subject positions such as homosexual or criminal identities. Historically, certain sexual or criminal behaviors were carried out without being categorized into specific subject positions by powers that defined societal norms. This establishes a link between Foucault's genealogical analysis and the everyday discourse surrounding dispositions. Disposition talk often risks morphing into the establishment of subject positions, which, according to Foucault, frequently emerge at society's fringes, where the extraordinary occurs.

However, my emphasis is on the ordinary, analyzing how typical individuals engage in conversations about dispositions—a dialogue that is increasingly contentious. It seems we possess an inherent inclination to categorize dispositions. Ian Hacking identifies four foundational logical prototypes: deduction, induction, abduction, and classification. While I do not wholly endorse this cognitive historical perspective, I propose that this inclination is instinctual, akin to activities like praying, confessing, cursing, reporting, doubting, criticizing, and gossiping. We engage in a form of intuitive knowledge about people that is not grounded in any specific theory or reasoning style. Although we may rely on certain cognitive frameworks, this is not the primary focus here.

This intrinsic understanding of individuals is neither a traditional theory nor merely a form of empathy or simulation, nor a blend of the two. We participate in this language game when biographical accounts fail to suffice. Often, we describe someone by recounting their life experiences (career, relationships, hardships). In many instances, such biographical narratives suffice for mutual comprehension in daily interactions. Yet, we also possess a natural tendency to philosophize about others and ourselves, even in commonplace situations. We engage in broad speculations, falling prey to linguistic traps, pondering thoughts like: "He is a thinker but can also empathize; his emotions are broad rather than deep, not the kind that translates into poetry, more akin to someone who runs an animal shelter. Nonetheless, he remains fundamentally a thinker." This is how we engage in dialogue with others and ourselves—a distinctly human trait.

I wish to briefly explore an alternative framework for understanding individuals—one that operates entirely beyond language and philosophical discourse, driven by intuition, sympathy, or "chemistry." This approach is not typically how we view ourselves or others. Nietzsche often delves into this alternative perspective. However, since this instinctual manner of understanding is considered almost 'too primitive' in our scientific age, it feels peculiar to ponder it, let alone implement it, although we all instinctively do so as beings.

Still, we soon find ourselves engaging in rudimentary language games concerning our understanding of people, where we aim to convey the dispositional essence of a person to someone who is absent, making non-verbal indication impossible.

The contexts in which we develop this primitive linguistic approach to discussing others and ourselves—identified by Ryle as disposition talk—are diverse: contentious debates, relationship challenges, career decisions, therapy, psychiatry, job interviews, and so forth. This inclination is natural and unproblematic. However, various practices have arisen around this instinct, similar to confession, leading people to believe that comprehending others is inherently complex. And indeed, it is; numerous pitfalls exist.

One quickly realizes that the general terms used in disposition discourse are notoriously vague. Initially, one might assume that a few words would suffice to convey understanding regarding a person's "type," "temperament," or "nature." Unfortunately, that assumption is misleading. One might then think that providing biographical context could mitigate these challenges. Rather than throwing around five words over the phone (intellectual, cool, womanizer, engineer-type, insecure), one might consider drafting a five-page essay about the individual encountered. Surely, after reading such an essay, my friend would understand exactly the type of person I've met! However, by supplying extensive context and personal biography, including the reasons my account resonates with me, we might drift toward hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, or literature. Yet here, one cannot simply offer a scientific explanation or a "method" to make dispositions experientially accessible.

My philosophical dilemma revolves around what a genealogy of this scientific inclination resembles—what power compels us to complicate our everyday, ordinary knowledge of individuals in favor of a scientific approach. What grammatical images or metaphors contribute to the belief that a person's "intelligence" (or traits like altruism, empathy, resilience, etc.) can be more accurately assessed through an IQ test than through everyday language? The kind of human comprehension that is not linked to language games is fundamentally primitive and animalistic. It involves sensing someone's "chemistry," finding them sympathetic, or recognizing familial resemblances. It may necessitate a continual resetting of our perceptions of others, eliminating potential images or metaphors. This task is easier said than done and is infinitely challenging. According to Iris Murdoch, this is an ongoing moral endeavor—the moral task par excellence: striving to see others on their own terms.

Disposition talk, as something 'natural' or 'primitive' (in Wittgenstein's context), has always existed. It likely explains the fascination some hold for astrology, phrenology, or physiognomy, and why such interests persist. Most individuals engage with it in a manner they perceive as unserious, merely for mutual understanding—as a heuristic; they "play along" in this dialogue. Much like how contemporary individuals may not attend church for confession, often approaching psychotherapy with skepticism, they may find themselves "playing along" in this institutionalized practice of confession. We soon realize a latent need for confession persists, even amid modern skepticism surrounding therapeutic services. This inherent, primitive need is what allows such practices to flourish.

Similarly, while it may seem absurd to take a personality or IQ test during a job application, we acknowledge a genuine interest in our own and others' dispositions, as demonstrated by the lively discussions about dispositions that arise during breaks. We may chuckle at Hogwarts House quizzes, but they resonate with a deep, instinctual tendency within us—one that has been heavily scrutinized in the modern Western context, particularly due to tragic historical events like eugenics and the Holocaust. We engage in these discussions discreetly, often behind closed doors; we moderns converse about disposition talk only in hushed tones—or scientifically, where it becomes more pronounced.

Chapter 2: The Pitfalls of Disposition Discourse

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