Chapter 1: The Debate on Free Will

In the realm of science, many researchers are drawn to philosophical inquiries, as seen in popular works like Sabine Hossenfelder’s Existential Physics and Carlo Rovelli’s Helgoland. Among them, Robert Sapolsky, a renowned biologist, addresses the enduring question of free will in his recent publication, Determined: A Science of Life without Free Will.

In a brief interview with neuroscientist Dr. Andrew Huberman, Sapolsky articulates his perspective on free will, asserting that we possess "not a shred of free will."

To summarize, Sapolsky presents a traditional determinist argument, suggesting that our choices stem from prior biological conditions, such as genetics and hormonal influences. According to him, our brains dictate our actions, leading us to believe that we made those decisions of our own volition.

His views are echoed by other scientists, including Hossenfelder, who claims that determinism in physics negates the existence of free will. I recall participating in a parliamentary debate at Trinity College Dublin, where I had to argue against the proposition of free will's existence. While I don't genuinely hold that belief, the arguments supporting determinism were compelling and sounded scholarly.

However, this conflation of determinism with free will by many distinguished scientists is regrettable. They often overlook the extensive philosophical discourse surrounding these concepts, which complicates what may seem like a clear scientific stance. Unlike empirical science, philosophy focuses on the discourse surrounding reality. The significance of language is paramount in philosophical discussions.

The phrase "I have free will" encompasses various interpretations, but three primary positions exist regarding free will in relation to determinism:

1. There is no determinism, and we possess free will.
2. Determinism exists, and we lack free will.
3. Determinism exists, yet we retain free will.

The third viewpoint, termed compatibilism, posits that determinism and certain notions of free will can coexist. In contrast, Sapolsky aligns himself with the non-compatibilist perspective, and it appears he does not entertain the alternative viewpoint.

Nonetheless, it is feasible to argue that even if my choices are predetermined, they remain my choices, made freely. This hinges on how we define the "who" behind those choices. Essentially, what do we mean by "I"?

Thanks to philosopher René Descartes, many in the modern West view free will as a function of a non-physical entity, such as the mind or soul, which governs the body. Neuroscience supports some aspects of this Western notion of the mind. One theory proposes that the brain comprises interconnected modules, each performing functions autonomously and unconsciously.

The mind could either emerge from the interconnections among these modules, as suggested by the "global workspace theory," or reside in the neocortex, where higher-order reasoning takes place. Thus, the mind can be seen as a driver—not of a vehicle but rather akin to an elephant, a metaphor used by psychologist Jonathan Haidt.

If we accept that the "I" is not distinct from the physical brain but emerges from it, possibly as a composite of perceptions arising from unconscious processing, then the "who" making decisions is, in fact, the brain itself. This perspective is echoed by psychiatrist Iain McGilchrist in his work, The Master and the Emissary, where he argues that the brain's biologically deterministic decision-making process constitutes the "I" making choices freely, irrespective of our conscious awareness of those decisions.

In this framework, the will is merely a physical process through which the brain evaluates actions in response to stimuli. Some philosophers challenge this view, asserting that human will can transcend the laws of nature, but no evidence currently supports such a claim.

For any definition of will, "free will" refers to the ability to "do otherwise" within given circumstances. For instance, if I can choose between chocolate and vanilla ice cream, I can order either flavor.

The simplest way to conceptualize the ability to choose differently is through "simple conditional analysis," which states that an agent S can choose otherwise if, given the choice, S would indeed make a different selection. While this seems straightforward, it falls short, as it merely indicates that if one chooses something, they will do it—contradicting the essence of free will, which should encompass the capacity for alternative choices.

We can refine this definition: an agent S has the ability to choose otherwise if, upon desiring or preferring to select differently, S would actually do so. This is a classic compatibilist stance, acknowledging that our desires may be predetermined, suggesting that we possess free will only in alternate possible scenarios where we might have different desires.

Critics argue that even this definition is inadequate since we often fail to act on our desires. The reality of brain function reveals competing desires, and our actions often reflect which part of the brain prevails. A classic illustration involves individuals who have undergone surgery to separate their brain hemispheres, where one side might resist actions initiated by the other.

If that is the case, our definition of free will based on desire may be flawed. Instead, we might need to define it in terms of the "strongest desire," which may be unconscious.

There are definitions of free will that contradict determinism, such as categorical analysis: an agent S has the ability to choose or act otherwise at time t if, holding everything constant up to t, it was possible for S to choose differently at that moment. Determinism posits that if circumstances remain unchanged, only one outcome is feasible.

Interestingly, categorical analysis also acknowledges that our choices could be non-deterministic yet random, as seen in quantum experiments. Such choices could still be deemed "free," even if they arise from a quantum coin flip.

Regardless of the definition—whether deterministic or random—one may ponder whether any action holds value. Can genuine change or improvement occur if everything is predetermined?

If we equate our identity with our brain, questioning the worth of our actions seems absurd. If you yearn for change, you are already positioned to make a choice towards self-improvement. This aligns with what simple conditional analysis suggests.

Determinism does not imply that one is fated to remain unchanged; instead, it indicates a trajectory that encompasses all of your free choices.

In this enlightening conversation, Robert Sapolsky discusses the implications of living without free will and the nuances of choice in a deterministic world.

In this video, Robert Sapolsky delves deeper into the concept of life without free will, exploring its philosophical and scientific ramifications.